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NEW JERSEY BLURS THE CONTOURS OF
THE "SUBSTANTIAL CERTAINTY"
STANDARD: MILLISON v. E.L DU PONT
DE NEMOURS & CO.
Workers' compensation1 laws were enacted in the United
States in the early twentieth century2 as a legislative response to
1 See 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1 (1985). Workers' com-
pensation has been defined as "a mechanism for providing cash-wage benefits and medical
care to victims of work-connected injuries, and for placing the cost of these injuries ulti-
mately on the consumer, through the medium of insurance, whose premiums are passed on
in the cost of the product." Id.; see also Morris v. Hermann Forwarding Co., 18 N.J. 195,
197-98, 113 A.2d 513, 514 (1955) (purpose of workers' compensation is to have industry pay
for industrial accidents and pass on cost to consumers); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Zuckerman,
106 R.I. 534, 541, 261 A.2d 844, 848-49 (1970) (primary object to provide economic assis-
tance for industrial injuries). Workers' compensation has been categorized as a form of strict
liability. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 573 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter W. PROSSER & W. KEETON].
The crucial test of the applicability of workers' compensation is, whether there is a
work-connected injury. 1 A. LARSON, supra, at § 2.10. See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore,
263 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1923); Geltman v. Reliable Linen & Supply Co., 128 N.J.L. 443, 446-
47, 25 A.2d 894, 896 (1942); Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 298 N.Y. 468, 472, 84 N.E.2d
781, 783 (1949).
Injured employees receive a fixed percentage of their weekly wage up to a statutory
maximum, as well as hospital and medical benefits. 1 A. LARSON, supra, at § 1.10. In the
event of loss of a limb, organ, body function, or even death, a schedule of predetermined
benefits is often established. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-12 (West Supp. 1986) (stipu-
lated benefits for death or loss of member(s), vision, hearing, etc.). Claims under workers'
compensation acts for injuries such as pain and suffering, disfigurement, or loss of consor-
tium typically have been denied. See Ponder v. Southern Tea Co., 170 Ga. App. 819, 820,
318 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1984) (loss of consortium); Fisher v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 12
Or. App. 417, 420, 507 P.2d 53, 55 (1973) (pain and discomfort); Clayton v. Pizza Hut, Inc.,
673 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tenn. 1984) (permanent scars).
I See generally 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 5 (discussing origins of workers' com-
pensation). In the early 1900's, various states created committees to study the increase of
industrial accidents and to suggest remedies for them. Id. at § 5.20. New York, in 1910
enacted the first workers' compensation legislation. See Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 674, [1910
N.Y. Laws 1945. The statute was later held unconstitutional by the court of appeals, as an
imposition of liability without fault, which constituted the taking of property without due
process of law. See Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 298, 94 N.E. 431, 440 (1911).
The New York State Legislature responded by amending the state constitution. See 1913
N.Y. LAWS 2225, incorporated at N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 18. The United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the New York law in New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243
U.S. 188, 205 (1917).
The federal government adopted a workers' compensation plan in the Federal Employ-
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the inadequate common law remedies available to employees in-
jured in industrial accidents.3 In exchange for assured, predeter-
mined benefits, workers waived their rights to traditional tort rem-
edies against their employers." Exceptions to this "exclusive
remedy rule" were initially carved out by the courts5 and later by
ers' Liability Act of 1908. See 35 Stat. 65, c. 149 (1908), codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§
51-59 (1976). New Jersey's workers' compensation act was enacted in 1911. See 1911 N.J.
Laws 95, codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-1 et seq. (West Supp. 1986).
The last such legislation was enacted by Hawaii in 1963. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 1, § 80, at 573. Today approximately 90 percent of all workers are covered. U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS 1982, at 1 (1982). See
generally Perlin, The German and British Roots of American Workers' Compensation Sys-
tems: When is an 'Intentional Act' 'Intentional?, 15 SETroN HALL L. REV. 849 (1985) (Euro-
pean acts were source of American enactments); Rhodes, The Inception of Workmen's Com-
pensation in the United States, 11 ME. L. REv. 35 (1917) (early history of workers'
compensation legislation).
3 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 4. An estimated 70 to 94 percent of injuries from
industrial accidents went uncompensated by the common law. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 1, § 80, at 572 n.43. Employees were unable to recover for these injuries largely
because of the "unholy trinity" of common law defenses available to employers: contribu-
tory negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow-servant rule. Id. at 569. An employee was
required to exercise reasonable care for his own safety, therefore contributory negligence
would bar recovery. Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. Ry., 220 U.S. 590, 596 (1911). By ac-
cepting employment, a worker assumed the risk of hazards normally incident to the job.
Cooper v. Mayes, 234 S.C. 491, 495, 109 S.E.2d 12, 13 (1959). Finally, the fellow-servant rule
prohibited an employee from suing his employer for the negligence of a co-worker. Farwell
v. Boston & W. Ry., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842).
4 See Lee v. American Enka Corp., 212 N.C. 455, 462, 193 S.E. 809, 812 (1937); 2A A.
LARSON, supra note 1, § 1.20, at 2 (1985). This quid pro quo has been viewed as equally
balanced. See id. In exchange for relinquishing the right to a tort claim with dubious
chances of recovery, an employee received speedy and assured benefit payments. See Jensen
v. Southern Pac. Co., 215 N.Y. 514, 527, 109 N.E. 600, 603 (1915), rev'd on other grounds,
244 U.S. 205 (1917); see also Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of
Workers' Compensation Statutes, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1641, 1641 (1983) (employees relinquish-
ing right to sue not a great loss at time of enactments). Although the employer became
strictly liable for his employees' injuries, he was relieved of defending burdensome tort
claims. See Galimi v. Jetco., 514 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir. 1975); 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, at
§ 65.11. It was believed that this balance would benefit society by avoiding litigation and
lowering the costs of accidents. See Galimi, 514 F.2d at 952; Craft v. Gulf Lumber Co., 151
La. 281, 284-85, 91 So. 736, 737 (1922).
1 See Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930). The remedy provided in
workers' compensation acts is generally exclusive of all other statutory or common law rem-
edies. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West Supp. 1986). The first intentional tort excep-
tion to the exclusive remedy rule was created for the assault and battery of an employee by
his employer. See Boek, 180 Minn. at 471, 231 N.W. at 234 (1930); Rumbolo v. Erb, 19 N.J.
Misc. 311, 311, 20 A.2d 54, 54 (1941), overruled on other grounds, Martin v. Snuffy's Steak
House, 46 N.J. Super. 425, 440, 134 A.2d 789, 798 (1957); Le Pochat v. Pendleton, 187 Misc.
296, 298, 63 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315 (1946), aff'd mem., 271 App. Div. 964, 68 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1st
Dep't 1947). Some jurisdictions have expanded the intentional tort exception to include
false imprisonment, see Skelton v. W.T. Grant Co., 331 F.2d 593, 595 (5th Cir. 1964), cert.
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state legislatures.' As the likelihood and amount of recovery in-
creased under modern tort law,7 injured employees sought to fit
their claims within one of these exceptions so as to be able to sue
in tort.8 Employees afflicted with occupational diseases have at-
tempted to characterize their disabilities as the result of inten-
tional employer conduct that falls within a tort exception to work-
ers' compensation laws.9 Recently, in Millison v. E.L du Pont de
denied, 379 U.S. 830 (1964); Schutt v. Lado, 138 Mich. App. 433, 437, 360 N.W.2d 214, 216
(1984), and the intentional infliction of emotional distress by an employer, see Cohen v.
Lion Prods. Co., 177 F. Supp. 486, 489 (D. Mass. 1959). See generally Page, The Exclusivity
of the Workmen's Compensation Remedy: The Employee's Right to Sue His Employer in
Tort, 4 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 555, 559-67 (1963) (discussing creation and reasoning of
judicial exceptions).
0 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022(A), (B) (1985) (willful misconduct of em-
ployer allows suit); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.610(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983) (deliber-
ate intention of employer to produce injury or death allows suit); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
23:1032 (West 1986) (employer civilly and criminally liable for "intentional act"); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:15-8 (West Supp. 1986) ("intentional wrong" of employer not covered); S.D. CoDi-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 62-3-2 (1978) (employer's "intentional tort" preserves common law rights);
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 5 (Vernon 1967) (willful act, omission, or gross negli-
gence of employer causing employee's death allows suit); W.VA. CODE § 23-4-2(2) (1985)
("deliberate intention").
The states which allow exceptions to the exclusivity of their workers' compensation
acts, whether by case law or legislation, are in the minority. See Note, Blankenship v. Cin-
cinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc.: Some Fairness for Ohio Workers and Some Uncertainty
for Ohio Employers, 15 U. TOL. L. REv. 403, 421 (1983).
1 See Note, supra note 4, at 1645. Modern tort law has made negligence easier to prove.
Id. The three greatest bars to recovery have lost much of their power. See W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra note 1, at §§ 65-68, 80. Comparative negligence has replaced contributory
negligence in at least 40 states. See id. at § 67, at 471. Assumption of risk has either been
abolished or "seriously modified" in 19 jurisdictions. Id. at § 68, at 496 n.56. The fellow-
servant rule has been restricted "as its hardships upon labor became apparent." Id. at § 80,
at 572.
8 See, e.g., Fountain v. Shoney's Big Boy Inc., 168 Ga. App. 489, 489, 309 S.E.2d 671,
671 (1983) (employee claimed employer liable for assault committed by co-worker); Glenn v.
Farmland Foods, Inc., 344 N.W.2d 240, 241 (Iowa 1984) (employee sued employer for gross
negligence of co-worker); Doe v. St. Michael's Medical Center, 184 N.J. Super 1, 3-4, 445
A.2d 40, 42-43 (1982) (employee claimed employer had dual capacity as landlord and em-
ployer and thus liable for assault committed by third party).
9 See 1B A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 41 (1986). Occupational disease is "any disease
arising out of exposure to harmful conditions of the employment, when those conditions are
present in a peculiar or increased degree by comparison with employment generally." Id.
Every jurisdiction has general occupational disease coverage. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:15-30 (West Supp. 1986). Occupational diseases are typically covered through a statutory
definition, an interpretation of the term "injury," a stipulated list of diseases, or by a sepa-
rate act. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 656.802 (1985) (definition); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208 (Deer-
ing 1976) ("injury" interpretation); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1208 (Purdon Supp. 1986) (list
of diseases); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 172.36-.59 (Smith-Hurd 1986) (separate act).
By 1978 an estimated two million workers had been disabled by occupational disease.
Edes, Compensation For Occupational Diseases, 31 LAB. L.J. 595, 596 (1980). Approxi-
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Nemours & Co.,10 the Supreme Court of New Jersey redefined the
standard for determining whether an employer's conduct consti-
tutes an intentional wrong against an employee within the meaning
of the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act.11
In Millison, the plaintiffs, former employees of E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. ("du Pont"), claimed that du Pont had intention-
ally injured them through deliberate exposure to asbestos. 2 The
plaintiffs further alleged that du Pont had conspired with its code-
fendants, du Pont physicians, to fraudulently conceal the existence
of the asbestos-related diseases contracted by its employees.13 The
plaintiffs contended that these actions constituted intentional
wrongs under the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act ("the
mately one out of five individuals severely disabled by an occupational disease receives no
disability benefits. Id. Workers' compensation only replaces approximately five percent of
lost income of occupational disease sufferers. Id. at 597. Sixty percent of all occupational
disease workers' compensation awards are initially denied, as compared to only ten percent
of job injury claims. Id. "[W]orkers disabled from an occupational disease [do not] receive
an equitable trade-off when they give up their legal rights to sue employers for work-related
illnesses in exchange for workers' compensation benefits." Id. at 599.
As a result, employees afflicted with occupational diseases often attempt to characterize
their injuries as intentionally inflicted in order to escape the limited remedies of workers'
compensation laws. See Boudeloche v. Grow Chem. Coatings Corp., 728 F.2d 759, 760 (5th
Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27
Cal. 3d 465, 469, 612 P.2d 948, 950, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 860 (1980); Genson v. Bofors-Lake-
way, Inc., 122 Mich. App. 470, 473, 332 N.W.2d 507, 508 (1983); Blankenship v. Cincinnati
Milacron Chems., Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 609, 433 N.E.2d 572, 574 (1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 857 (1982); see generally 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 68.32(c).
Diseases associated with asbestos exposure are a major category of occupational dis-
eases, with an estimated 27.5 million workers in the United States incurring such exposure
between 1940 and 1979. See Comment, Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 871,
871 (1985). Over 30,000 claims have been filed against asbestos manufacturers since the
early 1970s, and tens of thousands more may be fied in the future. D. HENSLER, W. FEL-
STINER, M. SELVIN & P. EBNER, ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS Toxic
TORTS 1 (1985) [hereinafter ASBESTOS].
10 101 N.J. 161, 501 A.2d 505 (1985).
" See id. at 178, 501 A.2d at 514.
1'2 See id. at 166, 501 A.2d at 508.
11 See id., 501 A.2d at 508. Asbestos is an incombustible, nonconducting, chemically
resistant mineral that readily separates into long flexible fibers. See WEnSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 126 (1963); Mehatty, Asbestos-Related Lung Disease, 16 FORUM
341, 342 (1980).
Inhalation of asbestos is known to cause three diseases: asbestosis, lung cancer, and
mesothelioma. ASBESTOS, supra note 9, at 13. Asbestosis is caused by scar tissue formed by
inhaled asbestos dust; the scar tissue causes a decrease in pulmonary function, literally
strangling the lungs. Id. at 14. Lung cancer caused by asbestos is characterized by its devel-
opment in the lower lobes of the lungs, whereas lung cancer from other causes is found in
the upper lobes. Id. Mesothelioma is a rare cancer that begins in the lining of the lungs,
abdominal cavity, or heart. Id.
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Act"),'14 and thus gave rise to tort claims distinct from the limited
benefits available under the Act. 15 The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment to du Pont, based upon the "exclusive remedy"
provision in the Act, but denied it to the company physicians."6
The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment as to du Pont, but
reversed in favor of the physicians' motion for summary
judgment."
The Supreme Court of New Jersey found that the employees
had not stated a claim against du Pont for the alleged intentional
exposure to asbestos, despite du Pont's awareness of the risk of
injury.'8 The majority adopted the "substantial certainty" test for-
mulated by Dean Prosser and contained in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts as the standard for determining whether an inten-
tional wrong was committed under the Act.' 9 A valid claim, under
this test, must allege that an employer knew with substantial cer-
14 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:15-1 to -128 (West Supp. 1986).
" See Millison, 101 N.J. at 170, 501 A.2d at 510. Section 34:15-8 of New Jersey's Work-
men's Compensation law provides, in pertinent part, that adoption of workers'
compensation:
[S]hall be a surrender by the parties thereto of their rights to any other method,
form or amount of compensation or determination thereof than as provided in this
article....
If an injury or death is compensable under this article, a person shall not be liable
to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death for any
act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person
injured or killed, except for intentional wrong.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West Supp. 1986). Prior to 1961 the only exception to the exclu-
sivity of New Jersey's Act was for assault and battery. See Rumbolo v. Erb, 19 N.J. Misc.
311, 20 A.2d 54 (1941), overruled on other grounds, Martin v. Snuffy's Steak House, 46 N.J.
Super. 425, 440, 134 A.2d 789, 798 (1957). In 1961 the Act was amended to include the
intentional wrong exception. See 1961 N.J. Laws c. 2, p. 14, § 1.
1 See Millison, 101 N.J. at 167, 501 A.2d at 508.
17 See id., 501 A.2d at 508.
" See id. at 179, 501 A.2d at 514-15.
19 Id. at 177-78, 501 A.2d at 514. Prosser's "substantial certainty" standard provides
that an individual has the intent to bring about given consequences not only if he acts for
the sole purpose of bringing them about, but also if he acts "having in mind a belief (or
knowledge) that given consequences are substantially certain to result from the act." W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 1, § 8, at 34 (footnotes omitted). "[T]he mere knowledge
and appreciation of risk-something short of substantial certainty-is not intent." Id. at 36.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that a person acts with intent if the "actor
desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are sub-
stantially certain to result from it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 8A (1965). The offi-
cial comment to the Restatement explains that if an actor is "substantially certain [of the
consequences] to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he
had in fact desired to produce the result." Id. at § 8A comment b.
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tainty that an injury would occur to its employees.20
According to the Millison majority, the plaintiffs' first count
did not sufficiently allege that the defendants knew with substan-
tial certainty that its conduct would produce injury.21 The plain-
tiffs' claim, therefore, only amounted to an accusation that du
Pont took risks with the health of its employees. 22 "[M] ere knowl-
edge and appreciation of a risk-even the strong probability of a
risk," according to the court, "come[s] up short of the 'substantial
certainty' needed to find an intentional wrong. '23 The majority
concluded that du Pont's exposure of its employees to an asbestos-
laden work environment did not constitute an intentional wrong.24
The court determined, however, that du Pont's actions in conjunc-
tion with its physicians may have constituted the intentional
wrong of deceit.25 The risk of an employer's fraud is not one an
employee assumes; nor does employer fraud arise out of the em-
ployment.2" Thus, according to the court, the allegation of the clear
intentional wrong of fraud was sufficient to state a claim for aggra-
vation of the plaintiffs' illnesses.2 7
Justice Handler, while concurring with the majority's adoption
of the "substantial certainty" standard, dissented as to the major-
ity's application of that standard to the facts. 28 The dissent con-
tended that despite the court's express acceptance of the "substan-
tial certainty" standard, the majority had applied the older
"deliberate intent" criterion previously used as the test for the in-
tentional wrong exception to the Act.29 Justice Handler concluded
20 See, e.g., Boudeloche v. Grow Chem. Coatings Corp., 728 F.2d 759, 761 (5th Cir.
1984) (per curiam) (order to employee to work in tank filled with noxious fumes with knowl-
edge of danger satisfies "substantial certainty" standard); VerBouwens v. Hamm Wood
Prods., 334 N.W.2d 874, 876 (S.D. 1983) (knowledge of probable risk of injury not same as
substantial certainty).
21 See Millison, 101 N.J. at 178, 501 A.2d at 514.
212 See id. at 178, 501 A.2d at 514-15.
21 Id. at 179, 501 A.2d at 514-15.
2' See id., 501 A.2d at 514.
25 See id. at 181-82, 501 A.2d at 516.
26 Id. at 182, 501 A.2d at 516.
27 See id. at 181-82, 501 A.2d at 516.
28 See id. at 190, 501 A.2d at 520 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
29 See id. at 191-92, 501 A.2d at 521-22 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
"Deliberate intent" has been defined as "an actual, specific" desire to injure. Phifer v.
Union Carbide Corp., 492 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Ark. 1980); see also Tyner v. Fort Howard
Paper Co., 708 F.2d 517, 518 (10th Cir. 1983) (same). It does not include willful, wanton,
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that a "conscientious" application of the "substantial certainty"
standard to the plaintiffs' allegations should have resulted in both
claims being tried before a jury.30
In Millison, the New Jersey Supreme Court attempted to pro-
mulgate a test for determining when employer misconduct is suffi-
ciently egregious to entitle the victimized employee to abandon the
workers' compensation remedy in favor of a suit in tort.3 It is sub-
mitted that although the court purported to adopt the progressive
"substantial certainty" standard for analyzing employer behavior,
in actuality it applied New Jersey's traditional "deliberate intent"
test to du Pont's conduct. This misapplication may have arisen
from the court's inadequate definition of the requisite intent, as
well as from judicial reluctance to interfere in the workers' com-
pensation system. As a result, this decision has blurred the con-
tours of the intentional wrong exception to New Jersey's Work-
men's Compensation Act. This Comment will examine this growing
area of law and will suggest that had the Millison court indeed
applied the "substantial certainty" standard, the rights of workers
afflicted with occupational diseases to pursue a remedy outside the
strictures of workers' compensation would be far clearer than they
are at present. It will also be suggested that strong public policy
considerations dictate removal of the "deliberate intent" standard
from the tort exception to workers' compensation.
reckless, or grossly negligent acts. See Keating v. Shell Chem. Co., 610 F.2d 328, 332 (5th
Cir. 1980); Ulicny v. National Dust Collector Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1265, 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Finch v. Livingly, 42 App. Div. 2d 1035, 1035, 348 N.Y.S.2d 266, 268 (mem.) (4th Dep't
1973). Nor can "deliberate intent" be constructive. See Winterroth v. Meats, Inc., 10 Wash.
App. 7, 12, 516 P.2d 522, 525 (1973). Thus, this standard is at variance with that advocated
by Dean Prosser and the Restatement. See supra note 19; see also Note, Torts-Intentional
Torts In The Workplace-Further Erosion of the Workers' Compensation Exclusive Rem-
edy Bar to Tort Actions-Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems. Corp., Inc., 10 N. Ky.
L. REv. 355, 358 (1983) (purposeful or "actual" intent to harm necessary element of common
law action).
The "deliberate intent" exception has been viewed as a narrow exception. See Copeland
v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 492 F. Supp. 498, 501 (D.N.J. 1980); see also Shearer v.
Homestake Mining Co., 557 F. Supp. 549 (D.S.D. 1983) (expansive reading of intentional
tort exception would thwart purposes of workers' compensation), afl'd, 727 F.2d 707 (8th
Cir. 1984).
30 See Millison, 101 N.J. at 195, 501 A.2d at 523 (Handler, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
3' See id. at 176, 501 A.2d at 513-14.
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"SUBSTANTIAL CERTAINTY" VERSUS "DELIBERATE INTENT"
The majority of jurisdictions that have enacted workers' com-
pensation acts containing an intentional tort exception to their
acts' exclusivity have statutorily conditioned application of the ex-
ception on proof that the employer acted with a "deliberate in-
tent" to harm the employee.3 2 Under New Jersey's Act, in order for
an employee to sue in tort, the injury complained of must be the
result of an "intentional wrong." 33 The intentional wrong exception
to New Jersey's Act had previously been interpreted as requiring
proof of "deliberate intent. '34 Insofar as the intentional wrong ex-
ception eliminates the exclusivity rule of the Act and allows a tort
remedy,35 it is suggested that a tort law definition of intent, rather
than that of traditional workers' compensation law, should be ap-
plied to determine the existence of an intentional wrong. In Mil-
lison, the Supreme Court of New Jersey purported to adopt the
tort "substantial certainty" definition of intent.36 In its analysis,
however, the court approvingly cited cases which required, as a
necessary allegation, a demonstration of an actual, deliberate de-
sire of the employer to cause harm. 7 The majority thus equated
1 See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.610(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 101, § 44 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.24.020 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-
2(2) (1985).
"See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West Supp. 1986).
See Bryan v. Jeffers, 103 N.J. Super. 522, 523-24, 248 A.2d 129, 129 (App. Div. 1968)
(per curiara), cert. denied, 53 N.J. 581, 252 A.2d 157 (1969). It has been held that neither
allegations of failure to provide known safety protections, nor allegations of exposure of
employees to asbestos meets the "deliberate intent" standard. See Arcell v. Ashland Chem.
Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 495-96, 378 A.2d 53, 65 (Law Div. 1977) (failure to provide safety
measures); Copeland v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 492 F. Supp. 498, 500 (D.N.J. 1980)
(intentional exposure to asbestos insufficient to meet New Jersey deliberate intent require-
ment); Petruska v. Johns-Manville, 83 F.R.D. 39, 40 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (same).
5 See Estelle v. Board of Educ., 26 N.J. Super. 9, 26, 97 A.2d 1, 9 (1953) (workers'
compensation law does not bar a common law suit for injury not covered by the Act), modi-
fied, 14 N.J. 256, 102 A.2d 44 (1954).
36 See Millison, 101 N.J. at 178, 501 A.2d at 514. Although the court embraces the
"substantial certainty" standard, it provided no support for this action, see id., despite the
existence of case law on point in other jurisdictions. See Boudeloche v. Grow Chem. Coat-
ings Corp., 728 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Spivey v. Battaglia, 258 So. 2d 815
(Sup. Ct. Fla. 1972); VerBouwens v. Hamm Wood Prods., 334 N.W.2d 874 (S.D. 1983).
", See Millison, 101 N.J. at 170-73, 501 A.2d at 510-11. The "deliberate intent" stan-
dard has been used in a number of jurisdictions, including New Jersey prior to Millison. See
supra note 34. Thus the court was able to cite a number of cases employing the "deliberate
intent" standard. See Millison, 101 N.J. at 170-73, 501 A.2d at 511. These cases provide
strong support for the requirement of deliberate, actual, specific intent to injure as a neces-
sary element of the intentional tort exception. See id. at 171-73, 501 A.2d at 511.
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"substantial certainty" with "virtual certainty."38 Finding no dif-
ferences between "substantial certainty" and "deliberate intent,"
the court concluded that the "substantial certainty" standard was
not a repudiation of the older test." It is submitted, however, that
these two standards are mutually inconsistent, and that an express
adoption of "substantial certainty" necessarily invalidates the ap-
plication of "deliberate intent."40 The court's failure to clearly dif-
ferentiate between these two standards of intent has served to in-
fuse this area with uncertainty.
Interestingly, the court did not resort to an express intent
analysis when considering the plaintiffs' fraudulent concealment
claim.4 Fraudulent concealment was found to be intentional on its
11 See Millison, 101 N.J. at 178, 501 A.2d at 514. The Millison court relied upon Blank-
enship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 621, 433 N.E.2d 573, 581
(1982) (Locher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857
(1982), to demonstrate the equivalence of "substantial" and "virtual" intent. It is asserted,
however, that these adjectives are not synonyms; rather they describe differing degrees, in
this instance, of knowledge. "Substantial" has been defined as "to a large degree," WEB-
STER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2280 (1963), while "virtual" signifies "effec-
tively" that which has been stated. Id. at 2556. "Virtually certain" is another way to say
"actually certain," or "deliberately." It is contended this imprecision contributes to the diffi-
culty in determining what standard the court is actually applying. In equating "deliberate
intent" with "substantial certainty," the court has added a great deal of confusion to New
Jersey's workers' compensation law.
11 See Millison, 101 N.J. at 178, 501 A.2d at 514. The court declared that the "substan-
tial certainty" standard did not overrule the "deliberate intent" standard of Bryan v. Jef-
fers, 103 N.J. Super. 522, 248 A.2d 129 (App. Div. 1968) (per curiam), cert. denied, 53 N.J.
581, 252 A.2d 157 (1969). See Millison, 101 N.J. at 178, 501 A.2d at 514. In his dissent,
Justice Handler contended that the majority's "substantial certainty" standard did in fact
repudiate Bryan and its progeny. See id. at 192, 501 A.2d at 521 (Handler, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
1o Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §8A comment b (1965) ("substantial certainty"
includes constructive intent). Constructive intent was clearly rejected in New Jersey in
Bryan, 103 N.J. Super. at 523, 248 A.2d at 130; see also Phifer v. Union Carbide Corp., 492
F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (employer substantially certain injury to occur does not
deliberately intend to harm).
Significantly, the field of liability insurance law distinguishes the "substantial cer-
tainty" standard from the "deliberate intent" standard. See Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes,
76 N.J. 477, 488-89, 388 A.2d 603, 609 (1978) (Pashman, J., concurring). The difference in
the standards in the insurance context turns on the notion that a "substantially certain"
actor "intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts" while a person acting
"deliberately" causes an "intended result of an intended act." See id. at 488-89, 388 A.2d at
609 (Pashman, J., concurring). As workers' compensation is an insurance-based mechanism,
see Riesenfeld, Forty Years of American Workmen's Compensation, 35 MINN. L. REV. 525,
529 (1951), the interpretation given "deliberate intent" by the insurance law should be
noted.
41 See Millison, 101 N.J. at 182, 501 A.2d at 516. While the court undertook a compre-
hensive review of intent for the first cause of action, see id. at 169-73, 176-79, 501 A.2d at
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face.42 It is submitted that the court should have used the plain-
tiffs' second claim as an opportunity to further explicate the scope
and application of the intent standard. Instead, the court simply
concluded that there are obvious differences between an employer
maintaining a workplace that will cause illnesses without informing
employees, and not informing employees that they have in fact
contracted those illnesses.43 The court's determination of the sec-
ond claim was based upon these alleged differences.44 The differ-
ences between the two situations are, however, anything but appar-
ent under the "substantial certainty" standard.
It logically follows that if du Pont knew to a substantial cer-
tainty that continued exposure aggravated the condition of asbes-
tos-disease sufferers, it also had to know to a substantial certainty
that the initial exposure to asbestos is harmful.45 The failure to
reveal either known risk is, therefore, similarly intentional. Fur-
thermore, if du Pont had a duty not to conceal the existence of
disease from a worker, it should also have had a duty to inform the
employee of the potential for occupational disease.46 Insofar as
509-11, 514-15, the second claim received only a cursory review. See id. at 181-82, 501 A.2d
at 516.
42 See id., 501 A.2d at 516. The court described the allegation of fraudulent conceal-
ment as as "intentionally-deceitful action." Id., 501 A.2d at 516.
See id. at 182, 501 A.2d at 516.
4' See id. at 182, 501 A.2d at 516. A single case was cited by the court to support its
disposition of the second claim. Id. at 182-83, 501 A.2d at 516 (citing Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1980)). In Contra Costa, the Supreme Court of California held that an employer's inten-
tional exposure of an employee to asbestos was not a basis for a tort claim, but that an
employer's alleged fraudulent concealment of disease from an afflicted worker stated a com-
mon law claim. See Contra Costa, 27 Cal. 3d at 474-77, 612 P.2d at 954-55, 165 Cal. Rptr. at
864-65.
"5 See Millison, 101 N.J. at 193-94, 501 A.2d at 522 (Handler, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). While Judge Handler agreed that there was a triable issue as to fraudu-
lent concealment, he declared that "[i]t is unclear why a triable issue is not also presented
as to whether [the defendants]. . . had knowledge to a substantial certainty associated with
the initial asbestos exposure in the plants ... " Id., 501 A.2d at 522 (Handler, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
4' New Jersey has enacted a number of statutes to protect workers. The "Worker and
Community Right to Know Act," N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:5A-1 to -31 (West Supp. 1986), es-
tablished a "comprehensive program for the disclosure of information about hazardous sub-
stances in the workplace" because "individuals have an inherent right to know the full range
of the risks they face" on the job. Id. at § 34:5A-2. The New Jersey Legislature has also
sought to "reduce asbestos-related hazards by . . . [e]ncouraging competence, knowledge,
and reduced exposure to asbestos.. ." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-33 (West Supp. 1986).
Finally, the New Jersey Legislature has enacted the "Worker Health and Safety Act,"
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:6A-1 to -24 (West Supp. 1986) which requires employers to provide a
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both of the plaintiffs' claims involved the factual issue of the ex-
tent of du Pont's knowledge, both should have been presented to a
jury. Instead, the court treated the claims as distinct.47 It is sub-
mitted, therefore, that this analysis of du Pont's knowledge is illog-
ical and resulted from the court's failure to properly apply the
"substantial certainty" standard.
A WAY OUT OF THE MORASS
The Millison case presented the New Jersey Supreme Court
with an opportunity to liberalize New Jersey's workers' compensa-
tion laws as they apply to employees disabled by occupational dis-
eases.48 Not surprisingly, however, the court was reluctant to fully
apply the "substantial certainty" standard. 4 This reticence may
have stemmed from the judiciary's traditional reluctance to enter
into what is viewed as the legislative domain.50 Because compensa-
tion acts are generally liberally construed, 51 few courts have been
"reasonably safe and healthful" work environment. Id. at § 34:6A-3. The Commissioner of
the Department of Labor and Industry can enforce an order to correct a safety violation, id.
at § 34:6A-7, and employers are liable for civil fines ranging from $25.00 to $500.00 for each
day the violations exist, id. at § 34:6A-19.
It is submitted that allowing the plaintiffs' first cause of action to go to trial would be in
furtherance of these legislative goals.
47 See Millison, 101 N.J. at 181-82, 501 A.2d at 516.
41 See Note, supra note 4, at 1648. The present system has failed to properly compen-
sate employees and failed to induce employers to make work environments safer. See id.
Millison may affect a large number of future occupationally disabled plaintiffs. It has
been estimated that by the mid-1980's upwards of 3600 asbestos-related claims will have
been filed in federal and state courts in New Jersey. See ASBESTOS, supra note 9, at 26. The
"dual injury" result reached in Miflison is believed to be of "enormous potential impor-
tance" because of the increasing amount of asbestos-exposure litigation. See 2A A. LARSON,
supra note 1, § 68.32(c), at 13-55.
49 See Millison, 101 N.J. at 179, 501 A.2d at 514-15.
50 See id. at 179-81, 501 A.2d at 515-16. The Millison court is not alone in its fear that
an expansion of intentional tort exceptions by the courts would upset the delicate balance of
a workers' compensation system. See Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior
Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 474, 612 P.2d 948, 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 863 (1980); Kofron v.
Amoco Chems. Corp., 441 A.2d 226, 231 (Del. 1982); VerBouwens v. Hamm Wood Prods.,
334 N.W.2d 874, 877 (S.D. 1983) (Wollman, J., concurring specially); see also Note, supra
note 4, at 1654 (preferable to defer to legislature to modify workers' compensation).
5' See, e.g., Wenzel v. Zantop Air Transp., 94 N.J. Super. 326, 330, 228 A.2d 104, 107,
aff'd, 97 N.J. Super. 264, 235 A.2d 29 (1967); Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d
505, 508, 330 N.E.2d 603, 605, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 640 (1975); Guerra v. Workers' Compensa-
tion Appeals Bd., 168 Cal. App. 3d 195, 200, 214 Cal. Rptr. 58, 60 (1985).
Some workers' compensation statutes contain provisions mandating liberal construction
in favor of employees. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.95 (Baldwin 1980).
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willing to expand exceptions to these acts.5 2 Indeed, in some juris-
dictions, courts have refused to create any judicial exceptions to
workers' compensation laws.53 Courts which have attempted to ex-
pand an exception to the exclusivity of workers' compensation acts
often have been rebuffed by the legislature.5 4 It is submitted, how-
ever, that the Millison court's adoption of the "substantial cer-
52 See Billy v. Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 152, 159, 412 N.E.2d 934, 939,
432 N.Y.S.2d 879, 883 (1980); Crespi v. Ihrig, 99 App. Div. 2d 717, 718, 472 N.Y.S.2d 324,
324 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 63 N.Y.2d 716, 469 N.E.2d 526, 480 N.Y.S. 209 (1984); Cooper v.
Queen, 586 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).
52 See, e.g., Kofron v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 441 A.2d 226, 231 (Del. 1982); Lockard v.
St. Maries Lumber Co., 76 Idaho 506, 509, 285 P.2d 473, 474-75 (1955); Parker v. Energy
Dev. Co., 691 P.2d 981, 985 (Wyo. 1984).
Courts have refused to expand the exceptions to workers' compensation exclusivity out
of a belief that such exclusivity is essential to the preservation of the legislative bargain
underlying the acts. See Millison, 101 N.J. at 177, 501 A.2d at 513; Note, supra note 4, at
1661. Judicial adherence to a strict reading of the exclusive remedy rule has been criticized
by commentators as reflecting "an overly narrow view of the judicial role." Note, supra note
4, at 1653. Judicial reluctance, however, may be explained by the fact that only a minority
of state legislatures have enacted exceptions. See supra note 5.
" See Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 161 W. Va. 695, 246 S.E.2d 907 (1978). In
Mandolidis, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia adopted "substantial certainty"
as its standard of requisite intent, see id. at 706 n.9, 246 S.E.2d at 914 n.9, holding that an
employer who committed an intentional tort or engaged in willful, wanton and reckless mis-
conduct resulting in injury to an employee would no longer be protected from civil liability
by West Virginia's workers' compensation act. See id. at 706, 246 S.E.2d at 914. This deci-
sion rejected the previous "deliberate intent" interpretation given West Virginia's statute,
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(2) (1985), and was widely criticized. See Mandolidis, 161 W. Va. at
719, 246 S.E.2d at 921 (Neely, J., dissenting); Note, In The Wake of Mandolidis: A Case
Study of Recent Trials Brought Under the Mandolidis Theory, 84 W. VA. L. REv. 893, 897-
98 (1982); 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.13, at 13-8 & n.10.1. It was claimed that, as a
result of this holding, ensuing verdicts were exorbitant, and that the number of employee
claims and the costs of settlements increased. See Note, supra, at 927-28. This holding has
been characterized as "distinctly out of line" with the almost "unanimous" rule requiring
actual intent to injure. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.13, at 13-8 & n.10.1. Other
jurisdictions have specifically rejected the Mandolidis interpretation as well. See
VerBouwens v. Hamm Wood Prods., 334 N.W.2d 874, 877 (S.D. 1983) (Wollman, J., concur-
ring specially).
Finally, in 1983, the West Virginia Legislature statutorily overruled Mandolidis and
defined deliberate intent as "actual, specific intent." See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(2)(i) (1985).
The legislature stated that the intent standard was not satisfied by conduct producing re-
sults not specifically intended, by grossly negligent conduct, or by reckless misconduct. See
id.
In 1982, the California Legislature similarly rejected the California Supreme Court's
creation of a "dual-capacity" exception in Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Su-
perior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980), by amending the
California Labor Code to codify some of the judicially created exceptions to the exclusive
remedy rule and thereby preventing its further erosion by the judiciary. See 1982 Cal. Stat.
922, § 6 (codified as amended at CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(a), (b)(2) (Deering Supp. 1986)); see
also 1982 California Legislation, 14 PAc. L.J. 763 (1983).
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tainty" standard did not overreach judicial authority, and that
proper application of the standard would further the New Jersey
Legislature's stated policy of favoring protection of the health of
industrial workers.5 5
Additional support for the full application of the "substantial
certainty" standard can be found in the procedural setting of Mil-
lison. On a motion for summary judgment the plaintiffs' claim
must be viewed in its most favorable light .5  Here it would be as-
sumed that du Pont had exposed its workers with full knowledge
of the consequences."7 Based on this view of the facts, it is submit-
ted that this claim met the test for "substantial certainty" as
enunciated by the court.58 The danger of asbestos exposure and
inhalation has long been industry knowledge."' Moreover, the
plaintiffs alleged that du Pont possessed this knowledge, and thus
knew with substantial certainty that the level of asbestos in its
plants would eventually cause harm to its employees.60 The exis-
" See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:5A-1 to -31 (West Supp. 1986) ("Worker and Community
Right to Know Act"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-32 (West Supp. 1986) ("Asbestos Services");
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:6A-1 to -19 (West Supp. 1986) ("Worker Health and Safety Act"); see
also supra note 46 (discussion of policy rationales of these enactments).
:' Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 73-75, 110 A.2d 24, 27 (1954).
7 See Millison, 101 N.J. at 195-96, 501 A.2d at 523 (Handler, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
58 See id. (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The plaintiffs' inten-
tional exposure claim is based on the supposition that du Pont knew, with substantial cer-
tainty, that the asbestos would cause the disease which did in fact occur. See id. (Handler,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The second count, in essence, similarly alleges
that du Pont knew, with substantial certainty, that afflicted workers' conditions would
worsen by continued exposure. Id. at 166, 501 A.2d at 508. To recognize only the latter
count as valid is "unnecessarily and unfairly strict." Id. at 196, 501 A.2d at 523 (Handler, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is submitted that the court's artificial disection
of the counts substantially weakens its holding.
59 The danger of asbestos has been known since the 1920's. See Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp, 493 F.2d 1076, 1083-85 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974);
Johns-Manville v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 469, 612 P.2d 948, 950, 165
Cal. Rptr. 858, 860 (1980). Asbestos is an "unavoidably unsafe product" within the meaning
of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd.,
548 F. Supp. 357, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1982); see also Note, Workers' Compensation and The
Asbestos Industry, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1073, 1076-78 (1982) (discussing history of knowl-
edge about asbestos' dangerous propensities); B. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL
ASPECTS 1-36 (1985) (development of knowledge of asbestosis). But see Hardy v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1982) (reversing order allowing plaintiff to
proceed without proving asbestos to be unreasonably dangerous); Migues v. Fibreboard
Corp., 662 F.2d 1182, 1189 (5th Cir. 1981) (reversing reliance on Borel as holding that asbes-
tos products are unreasonably dangerous as matter of law).
"' See Millison, 101 N.J. at 196, 501 A.2d at 523-24 (Handler, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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tence of this knowledge was therefore a genuine issue of fact and
should have been presented to a jury.1
Case law in other jurisdictions also provides strong corrobora-
tion for the adoption of the "substantial certainty" standard.2 In
Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc.,3 several em-
ployees alleged that their employer had knowingly and intention-
ally exposed them to noxious chemical fumes. 4 The Ohio Supreme
Court allowed the tort claim, holding that, inasmuch as the expo-
sure may have been an intentional wrong, there existed an issue for
the trier of fact.6 5 Recognizing that intent plays an important part
in determining if an injury is covered by workers' compensation,
the Ohio court nonetheless strongly emphasized the public policy
arguments for allowing a victimized employee to sue in tort.6 It is
"1 See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 99 (2d ed. 1970). As the
claims involve du Pont's state of mind and extent of knowledge, summary judgment should
not be granted. See Hart v. Johnston, 389 F.2d 239, 241-42 (6th Cir. 1968) (per curiam);
Alvardo v. General Motors Corp., 229 F.2d 408, 412 (2d Cir. 1956) (opinion revised); Ruvolo
v. American Casualty Co., 39 N.J. 490, 500, 189 A.2d 204, 209-10 (1963); Judson v. Peoples
Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 76, 110 A.2d 24, 28 (1954).
02 See Boudeloche v. Grow Chem. Coatings Corp, 728 F.2d 759, 761 (5th Cir. 1984) (per
curiam); Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 95, 472 N.E.2d 1046, 1051 (1984); Reed
Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Sup. Ct. Tex. 1985).
63 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982).
" See id. at 608-09, 433 N.E.2d at 573-74.
" See id. at 615-16, 433 N.E.2d at 578.
I' ld. at 614-15, 433 N.E.2d at 577. The court read Ohio's liberal construction clause of
the Ohio workers' compensation act to mean that, as workers' compensation was meant to
remedy injuries "arising out of" employment, injuries, such as intentional torts, were not
covered by the act. See id. at 612-14, 433 N.E.2d at 575-76. The court did not determine
whether the employer's conduct was intentional, but merely stated that a cause of action
existed. Id. at 615-16, 433 N.E.2d at 578.
Chief Justice Celebrezze stated that denying the employees a cause of action for inten-
tionally inflicted injuries would allow corporations the ability to "'cost-out' an investment
decision to kill workers." Id. at 617, 433 N.E.2d at 579 (Celebrezze, C.J., concurring).
Blankenship has evoked both positive and negative responses, with most of the criti-
cism centering on the court's statutory analysis. See Note, supra note 29, at 366-73; see also
Note, supra note 6, at 429-35 ("progressive and enlightened" decision flawed by faulty rea-
soning and failure to define "intentional wrong").
At least one commentator has approved of the modern trend typified by the Blanken-
ship case, as being "consistent with the original purposes and goals of workers' compensa-
tion acts, in that it [fully affords] a separate remedy for employees forced to work under
hazardous conditions by employers who are fully aware of the risks involved ... ." Perlin,
supra note 2, at 878. Another commentator, however, has advocated that, rather than allow
the employee to resort to a tort claim, an increased benefit should be paid by the employer
for an intentional wrong. See Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of
Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. RE v. 775, 814 (1982).
It is submitted that inasmuch as the New Jersey Act contains a statutory exception, a
holding similar to Blankenship in Millison would not have been vulnerable to the same
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submitted that these policy arguments, which have been partially
crystallized by the New Jersey Legislature, favor an expansion of
the intentional wrong exception to the New Jersey Workmen's
Compensation Act.67
CONCLUSION
By enacting an intentional wrong exception to the otherwise
exclusive Workmen's Compensation Act, the New Jersey Legisla-
ture recognized that employers should not enjoy complete tort im-
munity. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, has unneces-
sarily clouded the determination of an intentional wrong by
adopting a standard progressive in name but not in application.
The court has attempted to expand employees' rights and, at the
same time, preserve the scope of the workers' compensation sys-
tem. This approach, however, has merely infused a sensitive area
with ambiguity. Had the court followed the progressive standard it
purported to adopt, it would have reached a more ameliorative re-
sult, thereby furthering the aim of workers' compensation to rem-
edy the plight of uninformed workers and to deter employers from
fostering ignorance of environmental hazards.
Vincent B. Tritto
statutory criticism that was levelled at Blankenship for simultaneously creating and ex-
panding an exception to the exclusivity provision.
11 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:5A:-1 to -31 (West Supp. 1986); supra note 46. While the
Millison court found the "Right to Know Act" to foreclose further expansion of the excep-
tion, see 101 N.J. at 180-81, 501 A.2d at 515-16, it is suggested that granting an independent
common-law tort claim for intentional exposure to dangerous substances clearly effectuates
the policies of the "Right to Know Act." See generally Note, supra note 4, at 1661 (judicial
recognition of exceptions contributes to achievement of safety, compensation, and equity
goals).
[Vol. 60:826
